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In most publications that deal with the Banking Union, the 
global financial crisis of 2008 is mentioned in the introduc-
tory paragraph. It is also the unavoidable starting point of this 
contribution, as it is the collapse of the banking sector that has 
shown the necessity to rethink the mechanism of banking su-
pervision. Economic growth and financial stability have been 
seriously damaged by the global crisis that has plagued the 
world since 2007. The financial and banking crisis shed some 
light on the need for stronger and more efficient supervision 
but also on the need for a more effective system of sanctions 
and penalties to be applied. In particular, the Eurozone proved 
to be particularly exposed to the waves of the market because 
of the differences in supervision policies among the Member 
States which adopted the Euro as a single currency. 
Whether more effective banking supervision could have pre-
vented the crisis is not sure, but at least the crisis uncovered 
one of its most fundamental flaws, namely that banking su-
pervision based on the Westphalian model of the nation-state, 
is not capable to grasp the risks inherent to the banking sec-
tor.  The banking system has played a key role in the financial 
crisis: major bank groups suffered deficits and debt positions, 
leading a number of them to seek State aid. In Eurozone coun-
tries, the banking and sovereign debt crises highlighted the 
flaws of a common monetary and currency Union without con-
sistency of banking supervision. Indeed, when the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers dragged major European banks into the 
crisis, it became clear that if risk knows no borders, neither 
should supervision. National regulators were faced with their 
insufficiency to face global problems and Eurozone Member 
States were particularly subject to spill-over effects from each 
other’s budgetary policies. 
This insight nourished the desire to achieve deep supervisory 
integration, a desire which eventually gave birth to a central-
ised structure, baptised the “European Banking Union”1. Since 
2010, the EU Commission has therefore taken an inclusive ap-
proach supporting the swift progress towards an integrated fi-
nancial framework as a vital part of the policy measures to put 
Europe back on the path of financial stability, economic recov-
ery and growth.2 In September 2012 the Commission present-
ed a communication entitled “A Roadmap towards a Banking 
Union” in order “to break the link between sovereign debt and 
bank debt and the vicious circle which has led to over €4,5 tril-
lion of taxpayers money being used to rescue banks in the EU”.3 
´The European Banking Union places the European Central 
Bank (ECB) at the heart of banking supervision in Europe and 
in particular in the Eurozone. It represents a product of a re-
cent tendency to transfer “decisive regulatory powers as well 
as powers concerning enforcement – investigations, measures 
and penalties – to the EU level”.4 
This article offers an account on the Single Supervisory Mecha-
nism, its functioning and its articulated sanctioning system, com-
posed of administrative measures and penalties. Part I analyses 
the institutional design and the complex legal framework com-
posed of both directly applicable European rules and national 
law implementing the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)5 
and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV).6 We will try 
to shed some light on the division of tasks between the ECB 
and the national competent authorities (NCAs) operating at 
national level.  Part II explores the investigatory powers the 
measures and penalties applicable in the framework of bank-
ing supervision and the proceedings for their enforcement. It 
will also discuss their controversial nature: administrative, pu-
nitive or quasi-criminal? Part III examines judicial protection 
for the supervised entities. Specific attention will be given to 
judicial review. Part IV will outline some conclusions.
I.  The SSM: a Mechanism of Single Supervision 
The Single Supervisory Mechanism is part of a broader ar-
chitecture that aims to consolidate the banking sector of the 
European Union. This project is named the European Bank-
ing Union, and is built on three pillars: The Single Supervi-
sory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM),7 and a uniform deposit guarantee scheme.8 This entire 
construction rests upon the foundations of the so-called Single 
Rulebook, which is composed of the CRR and the CRD IV. It 
contains a harmonised set of rules that aim to safeguard the 
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soundness, stability and integrity of the banking system, also 
referred to as “prudential regulation”. Such regulation con-
sists in requirements such as capital buffers, liquidity ratios, 
or large exposure limits on banks. Far from being an example 
of “rule making by principles”, the CRR and CRD IV provide 
detailed and precise enforceable rules.9  The two legal instru-
ments represent the substantive law on prudential and capi-
tal requirements for credit institutions in the European Union 
based on the international agreement called ‘Basel III’10 and 
they are applicable in both Eurozone and non-Eurozone Mem-
ber States. It is relevant to highlight that the different pillars 
of the banking union do not have the same territorial scope. 
While the SSM is limited to the Eurozone, all other pillars are 
applicable in the whole European Union. Within the Banking 
Union, the role of the SSM is to ensure that Eurozone banks 
respect the prudential requirements that are imposed on them. 
The SSM is shaped by Council Regulation (EU) no 1024/2013 
of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential su-
pervision of credit institutions (hereinafter the SSMR). As its 
title suggests, the SSMR entrusts the ECB with the enforce-
ment of prudential regulation. To that aim, the SSMR provides 
the ECB with a supervisory toolbox composed of investiga-
tive measures, administrative measures as well as administra-
tive penalties. Nevertheless, the SSM does not put the task of 
banking supervision exclusively on the shoulders of the ECB 
as the only supervisor. As revealed by its name, the SSM is a 
mechanism. It is a mechanism that, while relying on the assis-
tance, cooperation and expertise of multiple national supervi-
sory authorities, achieves single supervision of the Eurozone 
banking sector.
Within the SSM, the ECB has been given the exclusive com-
petence to carry out specific supervisory tasks, based on a 
cooperative framework that involves the national competent 
authorities (hereinafter NCAs). In order to determine the al-
location of enforcement powers between the ECB and the 
NCAs, the SSMR has adopted a distinction between signifi-
cant and less significant credit institutions.11 While the signifi-
cant institutions are under direct supervision by the ECB, less 
significant institutions remain under direct NCA supervision. 
This implies that the ECB can only directly exercise the supervi-
sory powers attributed to it by the SSMR over significant banks. 
By no means does the distinction between significant and 
less significant banks aim at excluding less significant banks 
from the SSM or from ECB supervision. Several features of 
the SSM establish the contrary. While the NCAs retain their 
power to adopt the supervisory decisions concerning less sig-
nificant banks, they must execute their mission in accordance 
with the regulations, guidelines or general instructions issued 
by the ECB, and are subject to a duty of cooperation in good 
faith as well as an obligation to exchange information with 
the ECB. Moreover, the supervision of less significant insti-
tutions remains subject to oversight by a specific Directorate 
General of the ECB entrusted with the indirect supervision of 
less significant institutions. In addition, the ECB may decide 
at any time to take over direct supervision over one or more 
less significant banks when this is considered to be necessary 
for the consistent application of high supervisory standards. 
Furthermore, where the SSMR does not confer certain powers 
of the ECB, for instance in the case of supervision of less sig-
nificant institutions, the ECB may require the NCAs by way of 
instructions to make use of their powers under and in accord-
ance with the conditions set out in national law. The NCAs 
must follow such instructions,12 even while the nature of their 
acts remains national.13 
While the ECB stays involved in the supervision of less sig-
nificant institutions, the NCAs are also involved in the su-
pervision of significant institutions that are under direct ECB 
supervision. This involvement intervenes both during the 
investigations and during the execution of specific measures 
or penalties. This reflects again the fact that the SSM is con-
ceived rather as a mechanism, than as a single supervisory en-
tity.14 The cooperation between the ECB and NCAs will play a 
crucial role in the effectiveness of the SSM.15 
The supervision of significant institutions is organised through 
the establishment of Joint Supervisory Teams (hereinafter 
“JSTs”). For each significant institution, a JST has been cre-
ated, composed of staff of the ECB as well as the NCAs. Every 
JST will be coordinated by a designated ECB staff member 
(the JST coordinator) and one or more NCA subcoordinators. 
The ECB is in charge of the establishment and composition of 
JSTs, but the appointment of staff members from the NCAs 
to JSTs is made by the respective NCAs. A JST is the main 
tool within which the NCA assist the ECB in the supervision 
of significant institutions and is a far-reaching example of a 
mixed administration. The JSTs are considered to be a corner-
stone and a symbol of the SSM,16 since the strength of this or-
ganisational structure lies in the fact that it relies on the NCAs’ 
experience and expertise to execute a policy that is decided 
on the European level. The JSTs should perform the supervi-
sory review and evaluation, participate in the preparation of 
a supervisory examination programme to be proposed to the 
Supervisory Board, including an on-site inspection plan, im-
plement the supervisory examination programme approved by 
the ECB and any ECB supervisory decisions, ensure coordina-
tion with the on-site inspection team referred and liaise with 
NCAs where relevant. The main supervisory task of the ECB 
is to “ensure compliance with” the prudential requirements of 
CRD IV and CRR by Eurozone banks. To perform this task, 
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the ECB can apply not only directly applicable Union law, 
such as CRR, but also national law exercising options granted 
by directly applicable Union law, or national law implement-
ing Directives,17 such as the national legislation adopted to 
transpose the prudential requirements of CRD IV. The fact 
that an EU institution can apply national substantive rules has 
been described as “a model of enforcement that is unseen in 
European law”.18 For the first time, indeed, a European institu-
tion will rely on the national implementation of European law 
to carry out its tasks. 
In order to ensure compliance with the above-mentioned pruden-
tial requirements, the ECB utilizes a set of supervisory powers, 
ranging from investigatory powers to preventive administrative 
measures and administrative (pecuniary) penalties. Unfortunate-
ly, these powers are not foreseen by one single legal basis. The 
supervisory toolbox of the ECB is composed of different layers, 
including directly applicable Union law (for instance, the SSMR, 
the SSM Framework Regulation – hereinafter SSMFR –, or Reg-
ulation 2532/98), as well as national legislation implementing 
Directives (for instance, CRD IV). 
The following section will discuss the different supervisory 
powers of the ECB on the basis of the distinction adopted 
by the SSMR itself, namely investigatory powers, the power 
to impose administrative penalties, and the power to take 
administrative measures that are not considered to be ad-
ministrative penalties. Attention will also be given to the 
procedural regime attached to the exercise of each of these 
powers. To remind, these are the powers that the ECB can 
exercise for the direct supervision of significant credit insti-
tutions. As pointed out above, when less significant credit 
institutions are concerned, the ECB’s powers are limited to 
issuing regulations, guidelines or general instructions to the 
NCAs, which need to adopt their supervisory decisions ac-
cordingly. The present analysis will be limited to the alloca-
tion of enforcement powers in case of breaches of CRD or 
CRR requirements by significant banks.
II.  The Different Layers of the ECB’s Supervisory Toolbox
To ensure compliance with the CRD/CRR requirements, the 
ECB has supervisory powers coming from different legal 
bases. According to the SSMR, the ECB not only has all the 
powers set out in the SSMR itself, but also has all powers that 
NCAs have under Union law, unless otherwise provided for 
by the SSMR.19 When it comes to investigatory powers and 
administrative measures that are not considered to constitute 
administrative penalties, the ECB possesses all of the powers 
that NCAs have under Union law, while the Regulation pro-
vides otherwise in the case of administrative penalties. 
1.		Investigatory	powers	
In order to fulfil its tasks, the ECB can rely on direct investiga-
tory powers provided by the Chapter III of the SSMR. These 
powers are not limited to significant banks but they also ap-
ply to investigations involving less significant banks when the 
ECB decides, pursuant to Art. 6(5)(d) SSMR, to make use of 
these investigatory powers with respect to a less significant 
supervised entity.20 In this case, the supervision is shared be-
tween the European level and the national level, because the 
decision of the ECB to carry on direct investigation cannot ex-
clude or limit the power of NCAs to supervise less significant 
banks. As a result, the investigatory powers of the ECB are not 
exclusive but they should be carried out in strict cooperation 
with the national authorities.
In order to carry out its tasks, the ECB has “appropriate su-
pervisory powers”. These powers include all the powers that 
Union law requires to be conferred on competent authorities 
designated by the Member States for those purposes. “To the 
extent that those powers fall within the scope of the supervi-
sory tasks conferred on the ECB, for participating Member 
States the ECB should be considered the competent authority 
and should have the powers conferred on competent authori-
ties by Union law”. The broad investigatory powers of the ECB 
include the right to request information from a wide range of 
entities and individuals, to carry out general investigations and 
to conduct on-site inspections. In order to open an investiga-
tion, the ECB shall adopt a specific decision specifying its le-
gal basis and purpose together with the intention to exercise 
the investigatory powers laid down in Art. 11(1) SSMR and 
the fact that any obstruction of the investigation by the person 
being investigated constitutes a breach of an ECB decision, 
susceptible to entail sanctions according to Art. 18(7) SSMR 
and in accordance with Regulation 2532/98.21 
The power to conduct general investigations is provided by 
Art. 11 SSMR according to which the ECB may conduct all 
necessary investigations of any legal or natural person “estab-
lished or located in a participating Member State”. This limi-
tation is relevant because it excludes any direct investigatory 
power outside the SSM-zone. The general investigations in-
clude the right to:
(a) require the submission of documents;
(b) examine the books and records and take copies or extracts from 
such books and records;
(c) obtain written or oral explanations from any legal or natural per-
son or their representatives or staff;
(d) interview any other person who consents to be interviewed for 
the purpose of collecting information relating to the subject 
matter of an investigation. 
In the first three cases, the ECB has the power to oblige the 
natural or legal persons under investigation to execute its or-
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ders. However, it lacks strict enforcement powers when a 
person obstructs the conduct of the investigation. In the lat-
ter case, the ECB should rely on the support of the NCAs 
where the relevant premises are located. In compliance with 
national law, the NCAs shall offer necessary assistance, in-
cluding granting the ECB access to the business premises of 
the supervised legal persons. No specific power is provided 
when it comes to private premises or vehicles of the manag-
ers or related staff.
While Art. 11 provides for the interview of any person on a 
voluntary basis, Art. 10 SSMR provides that the ECB may 
require from both legal and natural persons (including man-
agers or members of staff) all information that is necessary 
for supervisory and related statistical purposes. Upon such a 
request by the ECB, the legal or natural persons cannot refuse, 
and have to supply the information requested. This investigatory 
power conferred to the ECB interferes with the professional and 
banking secrecy existing in several Member States. Art. 10(2) 
SSMR makes clear that “professional secrecy provisions do not 
exempt those persons from the duty to supply that information. 
Supplying that information shall not be deemed to be in breach 
of professional secrecy”, including banking secrecy rules. Both 
the SSMR and the SSMFR are silent on the status of legal pro-
fession privilege. Recital 48 of the SSMR refers to it as a “fun-
damental principle of Union law, protecting the confidentiality 
of communications between natural or legal persons and their 
advisors, in accordance with the conditions laid down in the 
case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union”. This 
recital seems to recall the case law of the ECJ as developed 
in the field of competition law and in particular in the lead-
ing case of Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Ackros Chemicals v. 
European Commission.22 In that case the ECJ confirmed its 
restrictive interpretation refusing to modify or overturn prior 
precedent (dated back to 198223) according to which commu-
nications with in-house lawyers are not accorded legal profes-
sional privilege under European law. The SSMR is confirming 
this restrictive approach, which seems to be problematic if we 
consider the strong protection offered by the ECHR. 
The investigatory powers include the right to carry out all 
necessary on-site inspections at the business premises of the 
supervised legal persons.24 This power represents the most in-
trusive investigatory measure of the ECB and it is subject to 
prior notification to the NCA of the place where the premises 
are located. When the ECB is not suspecting any infringement 
of banking regulation, it notifies the supervised entity of its 
intention to carry out an inspection, specifying when it will 
take place. In exigent cases, “where the proper conduct and 
efficiency of the inspection so require, the ECB may carry out 
the on-site inspection without prior announcement”.25 In order 
to carry out these on-site inspections, the ECB appoints on-
site inspections teams composed by both ECB and NCAs of-
ficials.26 In case of obstruction, the NCA of the relevant Mem-
ber State provides for assistance including “the sealing of any 
business premises and books or records. Where that power is 
not available to the national competent authority concerned, 
it uses its powers to request the necessary assistance of other 
national authorities”.27 It means that the NCAs must assist, if 
necessary by force and by sealing any business premises and 
books or records. 
Due to their coercive nature, on-site inspections and forced 
sealing may require judicial authorization in several Member 
States. When that is the case, the prior authorization should 
be obtained before the investigatory measure takes place. This 
“dependence on national law leaves room for differences be-
tween the Member States”28 composing a variable geometry 
puzzle. The lack of a specific and common provision on judi-
cial authorization risks hampering the homogeneous applica-
tion of the SSM in the EU. It would have been preferable to 
establish common rules implying the need for a judicial au-
thorization when a coercive measure needs to be carried out. 
This solution would also have been more in line with the case 
law of the ECHR on access to business premises and sealing 
of books and records.
Furthermore, Art. 13 of the SSMR limits the effectiveness of ju-
dicial review by the national courts, by stipulating that national 
courts “shall control that the decision of the ECB is authentic 
and that the coercive measures envisaged are neither arbitrary 
nor excessive having regard to the subject matter of the inspec-
tion”.29 In principle national courts are entitled to check the pro-
portionality of the measures; to this aim, they may ask the ECB 
for detailed explanations on the grounds for suspicion that an 
infringement has occurred, its seriousness and to what extent 
the supervised entity is involved.30 However, the national courts 
“shall not review the necessity for the inspection” and they can-
not have direct access to the ECB’s file.
This information should be available to the national compe-
tent authorities concerned. It means that before making such 
a request, the ECB should verify the existing information al-
ready at disposal of the NCAs.31 The ECB and the national 
competent authorities should indeed have access to the same 
information “without credit institutions being subject to dou-
ble reporting requirements”.32
2.		Administrative	measures	and	penalties
The ECB legal framework distinguishes between administra-
tive measures and penalties, although this distinction is not 
always clear.
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a)  Administrative measures that are not considered  
to constitute administrative penalties  
Next to its sanctioning powers, analysed in the following para-
graph, the ECB can also adopt administrative measures that 
are not considered to constitute administrative penalties, as 
they are not foreseen under Art. 18, which is devoted to pe-
cuniary and non-pecuniary penalties. This power of the ECB 
stems once again from different legal bases. To remind, in con-
formity with Art. 9(1), 2nd indent SSMR, the ECB not only can 
exercise the powers directly granted to it by the SSMR, but 
also the powers that the NCAs have under relevant Union law. 
Art. 16(1) SSMR foresees that when a bank fails to honour the 
prudential requirements imposed by CRR, by the national leg-
islation exercising options granted by CRR, or by the national 
legislation implementing CRD IV, the ECB can take certain 
specific measures to require any entity under its supervision to 
take the necessary steps at an early stage. Likewise, the ECB 
can take the same measures when it has evidence that a bank is 
likely to breach those requirements within the next 12 months, 
or when its arrangements, strategies, processes and mecha-
nisms and the own funds and liquidity held by it do not ensure 
a sound management and coverage of risks. The wording of 
Art. 16(1) SSMR already suggests that these measures are not 
of a punitive, but rather of a preventive nature, since the pur-
pose is to intervene at an early stage, to avoid that there will be 
a breach in the near future, or to ensure a sound management 
and risk coverage. 
Art. 16(2) SSMR sums up the measures announced by Art. 
16(1). The ECB can require banks to hold own funds in ex-
cess of the capital requirements imposed on them, to reinforce 
the arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies, to 
present a plan to restore compliance with supervisory require-
ments, to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment 
of assets in terms of own funds requirements, to reduce the 
risk inherent in certain activities, products and systems of in-
stitutions, to limit variable remuneration as a percentage of 
net revenues where it is consistent with the maintenance of 
a sound capital base, or to use net profits to strengthen own 
funds. In addition, the ECB can restrict or limit the business, 
operations or network of institutions that pose excessive risks 
to the soundness of a bank, or request the divestment of ac-
tivities that would pose such risks. Furthermore, the ECB can 
also restrict or prohibit distributions by the institution to share-
holders, members or holders of Additional Tier 1 instruments 
where the prohibition does not constitute an event of default 
of the institution. Moreover, the ECB can impose additional 
or more frequent reporting requirements, and specific liquid-
ity requirements. It can also require additional disclosures and 
decide at any time on the removal of members from a bank’s 
management body who do not fulfil the requirements set out in 
CRR or in the national law implementing CRD IV. 
b)  Administrative penalties 
When imposing administrative penalties, the ECB has to take 
into account different rules in order to determine the level of 
the penalty to be imposed and the procedure to be respected. 
The applicable rules differ according to the source of the re-
quirement being breached, as well as the person to be sanc-
tioned. On the basis of these criteria, the SSMR itself makes 
a distinction between three types of penaltie,33 which is sub-
ject to a formal classification by the SSM Framework Regula-
tion.34  On the basis of this formal classification, three types 
of penalties will be discussed below in the following order: 
fines and periodic penalty payments, administrative pecuniary 
penalties, and penalties for “other breaches”. This order pre-
sents the sanctioning power of the ECB in a decreasing way, 
from direct sanctioning powers to indirect sanctioning powers. 
This order has been preferred for the present contribution, be-
cause the cases where the ECB only has an indirect sanction-
ing power, are negatively defined, starting from a definition 
of the cases where the ECB does have a direct sanctioning 
power. A special mention should also be made of the publicity 
of the aforementioned penalties, which in some cases could be 
considered as presenting a supplementary punitive character.
i)  Fines and periodic penalty payments  
Pursuant to Art. 18(7) SSMR, in cases of a breach of regula-
tions or decisions of the ECB itself, by natural or legal per-
sons,35 the ECB may impose sanctions in accordance with 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 
concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to im-
pose sanctions (hereinafter “Regulation 2532/98”). When 
breaches of ECB regulations or decisions are concerned, the 
SSMR falls back on the previous legal framework applicable 
to the sanctioning powers of the ECB. However, this does not 
mean that there are no novelties to be discovered. In fact, Reg-
ulation 2532/98 has recently been modified by Council Regu-
lation (EU) 2015/159 of 27 January 2015,36 in order to adapt 
the ECB’s sanctioning power to its new competences in the 
field of banking supervision. 
According to Regulation 2532/98, both fines and periodic 
penalty payments fall under the notion of “sanctions”.37 While 
fines are defined as “a single amount of money which an un-
dertaking is obliged to pay as a sanction”,38 periodic penalty 
payments are “amounts of money which, in case of a contin-
ued infringement, an undertaking is obliged to pay either as a 
punishment, or with a view to forcing the persons concerned 
to comply with the ECB supervisory regulations and deci-
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sions”.39 It is worth stressing that this second part of the provi-
sion seems to allow the ECB to apply periodic penalty pay-
ments as a mere measure, excluding the regime that is usually 
applicable to penalties.40
Regulation 2532/98 also foresees procedural rules to be respect-
ed when the ECB imposes fines or periodic penalty payments. 
These rules reflect the right of a supervised entity to be informed 
in writing about the findings of the investigation,41 the right to 
make submissions in writing within a reasonable time limit,42 
the right to be represented by lawyers or other qualified per-
sons at closed oral hearings,43 the right to have access to the 
file,44 and the right of internal45 as well as judicial review.46 
The SSM Framework Regulation classifies the ECB’s fines 
and periodic penalty payments imposed under Regulation 
2532/98 as administrative penalties.47 It provides also that 
the aforementioned procedural rules contained in Regulation 
2532/98 are further complemented by the procedural rules 
for the imposition of administrative penalties laid down by 
the SSM Framework Regulation itself.48 When it comes to 
fines, these rules are embedded in Arts. 123 to 127 of the SSM 
Framework Regulation, which are briefly presented below, as 
they are also applicable to administrative pecuniary penalties 
that are not fines and periodic penalty payments. For periodic 
penalty payments, Art. 129 of the SSM Framework Regulation 
provides for separate rules to complement those of Regulation 
2532/98. These rules reflect the right to be heard,49 the right of 
access to the file,50 and the right to be represented.51
ii)  Administrative pecuniary penalties 
Art. 18(1) SSMR provides the ECB with a direct sanction-
ing power. Indeed, the ECB has the power to impose specific 
pecuniary penalties if a legal person under its supervision, in-
tentionally or negligently, breaches a directly applicable act 
of Union law, in relation to which relevant Union law makes 
administrative pecuniary penalties available to NCAs. The 
material scope of this direct sanctioning power is represented 
by Art. 67(1) CRD IV, which requires the Member States to 
make administrative penalties available to NCAs in case of 
violations of specific CRR requirements.
Furthermore, Art. 18(1) SSMR does not limit the direct sanc-
tioning power of the ECB to the “significant” banks. As a 
consequence, the allocation of powers between the European 
and the national level seems unclear. Scholars are divided: on 
one hand they consider Art. 18(1) fully applicable toward any 
credit institution, regardless of their significance.52 On the oth-
er hand, the application of the significance criterion would be 
more consistent with the rules governing supervision. Further-
more, despite the silence of Art. 18(1) SSMR, Art. 124(1)(a) 
SSM Framework Regulation, dealing with the duty to referral 
of alleged breaches to the investigating unit, mentions only 
breaches “committed by a significant supervised authority”. 
It must be highlighted that the direct sanctioning power of the 
ECB is limited to “credit institutions, financial holding compa-
nies or mixed financial holding companies”. When individuals 
are concerned, the ECB has no direct power to impose sanc-
tions but it has to request the NCAs to impose sanctions on 
natural persons.53 Furthermore, it is worth stressing that Art. 
18(1) does not only limit the direct sanctioning power of the 
ECB to breaches by legal persons, but also to a specific struc-
ture of their conduct: the infringement should be intentional 
or, at least, negligent.54
The SSM Framework Regulation classifies the sanctions pro-
nounced by the ECB under Art. 18(1) SSMR as administrative 
penalties, and gives them the specific title of “administrative 
pecuniary penalties”, in order to distinguish them from the 
“fines and periodic penalty payments” that the ECB can im-
pose in case of breaches of ECB regulations and decisions.
Mirroring the sanctioning regime of Regulation 2532/98, the 
pecuniary penalties that the ECB can impose under Art. 18(1) 
SSMR amount to twice the amount of the profits gained or 
losses avoided because of the breach where these can be deter-
mined, or to 10% of the total annual turnover of a legal person 
in the preceding business year, or such other pecuniary penal-
ties as may be provided for in relevant Union law. 
Art. 18(3) further guides the sanctioning power of the ECB, by 
stipulating that all the penalties have to be “effective, propor-
tionate and dissuasive”. In line with the previous approach, it 
is to be expected that the ECB will consider a range of factors, 
among them the level of cooperation shown by the supervised 
entity, the seriousness, the repetition, the frequency and the 
duration of the offence, any potential profits obtained through 
it, the size of the supervised entity and – potentially – prior 
sanctions imposed by other authorities based on similar facts.55
Furthermore, in order to determine whether to impose a pen-
alty and in determining the appropriate penalty, the ECB must 
cooperate closely with the NCAs.56 The latter requirement will 
be facilitated by the fact that direct ECB supervision of sig-
nificant entities will be conducted through close cooperation 
within JSTs, as explained above. 
Arts. 123 to 127 of the SSM Framework Regulation provide for 
procedural rules that are applicable to the imposition of admin-
istrative penalties.57 They foresee that alleged breaches that are 
subject to administrative penalties – be they fines, periodic pen-
alty payments, or administrative pecuniary penalties – must be 
referred to an internal investigation unit (hereinafter IIU) that 
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is independent from the ECB Supervisory Board and Govern-
ing Council.58 The establishment of the IIU, foreseen by Art. 
123 of the SSM Framework Regulation, reflects the require-
ment of a separation between the investigating and decision 
taking phase for imposing administrative sanctions,59 as re-
quired by the Dubus jurisprudence of the ECtHR.60 Prior to the 
adoption of the SSM Framework Regulation, the Executive 
Board of the ECB cumulated the investigative and decision 
making functions under Council Regulation 2532/98, as this 
Regulation came into existence before the Dubus judgment.61 
This problem has been overcome, since Arts. 123 to 127 of the 
SSM Framework Regulation apply not only to the imposition of 
administrative pecuniary penalties, but also to fines and periodic 
penalty payments imposed under the 2532/98 Regulation.
While Art. 125 Framework Regulation further describes the 
powers of the independent investigation unit, Art. 126 Frame-
work Regulation is devoted to the procedural rights of the su-
pervised entity under investigation. These rights include the 
right to be informed of the findings of the investigation unit,62 
the right to make written submissions within a reasonable time 
limit set by the investigating unit,63 the right to be assisted and 
represented by lawyers or other qualified persons at closed oral 
hearings organised at the initiative of the investigating unit,64 
and the right of access to the file.65 Others are lacking, as it is 
the case for the right not to incriminate oneself. As stated in the 
Orkem case,66 the “Commission may not compel an undertak-
ing to provide it with answers which might involve an admis-
sion on its part of the existence of an infringement which it is 
incumbent upon the Commission to prove”. The case referred 
to fines applicable in competition law but the principle should 
apply also in the banking sector when it comes to ‘punitive’ 
penalties. As scholars already observed, “it would have been 
wise if the ECB obligation to ensure compliance with the right 
not to incriminate oneself would have been codified in the 
SSM Regulation or SSM Framework Regulation. For reasons 
of legal certainty of individuals, but also to prevent possible 
non-compliance with the right by the investigation unit”.67
iii)  Penalties for other breaches: Art. 18(5)
The ECB has not been left without powers where natural per-
sons or banks under its supervision breach other requirements 
than those that fall under the scope of Art. 18(1) SSMR. In 
cases not covered by Art. 18(1) SSMR, the ECB maintains an 
indirect sanctioning power. Art. 18(5) SSMR entrusts the ECB 
with the power to “require the NCAs to open proceedings with 
a view to taking action in order to ensure that appropriate pen-
alties are imposed”. 
Art. 134(1) of the SSM Framework Regulation frames this 
power, starting from a list of those cases that are not covered 
by Art. 18(1). To summarise, this list comprises all cases in 
which a breach is attributed to a natural person, in which a 
non pecuniary penalty is to be imposed, or in which the breach 
does not concern CRR requirements. In addition, Art. 134(1) 
SSM Framework Regulation also foresees the scenario where 
pecuniary or non-pecuniary penalties are to be imposed in ac-
cordance with relevant national legislation which confers spe-
cific powers to the NCAs in Eurozone Member States which 
are currently not required by the relevant Union law. 
In all these cases, as pointed out above, the ECB can request 
the NCAs to open proceedings. Art. 134(1) SSM Framework 
Regulation further clarifies that in respect of significant su-
pervised entities, an NCA shall open proceedings only at the 
request of the ECB where necessary for the purpose of carry-
ing out its task under the SSMR. This implies that the ECB can 
decide on the possibility of a sanction itself, even in case of a 
breach of national prudential requirements. This provision of 
the SSMR confirms that when it comes to significant entities, 
it is the ECB which has the power of direct supervision within 
the SSM, and for that purpose it can apply directly applicable 
Union law as well as national law implementing Union law. 
Even though NCAs can only open penalty proceedings upon 
request of the ECB, the mechanic nature of the SSM stays re-
flected through the fact that NCAs may ask the ECB to request 
it to open proceedings.68 
While the ECB can require the NCAs to open proceedings, the 
NCAs are not obliged to sanction. This can be deducted from 
their obligation to inform the ECB, upon completion of a pen-
alty procedure initiated at the request of the ECB, of the penal-
ties that have been imposed, “if any”.69 Consequently, only if 
the ECB decides not to request the NCAs to sanction, this de-
cision can be considered to be final and binding, as the NCAs 
will be without power to open proceedings. On the contrary, 
if the ECB decides to request the NCAs to open penalty pro-
ceedings, the NCAs maintain their discretion to decide on the 
existence and, a fortiori, the type and level of the sanction.70 
Since it is up to the NCAs to decide on the type and the level 
of the sanction, these questions will be appreciated at the na-
tional level and depends on the powers that NCAs enjoy under 
European as well as national legislation.71 If upon completion 
of a penalty procedure, an NCA decides to sanction, the Art. 
18(5) SSMR requires the penalty to be effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive. As the penalty proceedings are conducted by 
the NCAs, they fall within the sphere of national procedure. 
iv)  Publicity as an additional form of punishment?
According to Art. 18(6) SSMR, the ECB shall publish any ad-
ministrative pecuniary penalty directly applicable according to 
Art. 18(1) SSMR “whether it has been appealed or not, in the 
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cases and in accordance with the conditions set out in relevant 
Union law”, including information on the type and nature of 
the breach and the identity of the supervised entity concerned.
This practice, called “naming and shaming” amplifies the ef-
fects of the sanctions making it public and affecting the reputa-
tion of the financial entity or credit institution.
As highlighted by the Commission, the aim of publishing fi-
nancial and banking sanctions is twofold: on one hand, it has 
a strong deterrent effect on credit institutions, mainly because 
they will incur reputational damage. On the other hand, it 
helps the consumers and investors to be better informed and 
it would ‘punish’ any wrongdoers by avoiding the use of their 
services. To these aims, the publication of banking administra-
tive sanctions is a duty also for the Member States. Art. 68 
CRD IV introduced new rules on the publication of admin-
istrative sanctions, according to which “Member States shall 
ensure that the competent authorities publish on their official 
website at least any administrative penalties against which 
there is no appeal and which are imposed for breach of the 
national provisions transposing this Directive or of Regula-
tion (EU) No. 575/2013, including information on the type and 
nature of the breach and the identity of the natural or legal 
person on whom the penalty is imposed, without undue delay 
after that person is informed of those penalties”. Publication of 
penalties against which there is an appeal is not excluded, but 
in this case competent authorities “shall, without undue delay, 
also publish on their official website information on the ap-
peal status and outcome thereof”. A few exceptions to the duty 
to publish the name of the entity submitted to the administra-
tive penalties, authorising anonymised data, are (a) the risk to 
jeopardise the stability of the financial markets or an on-going 
criminal investigation; or (b) to cause a disproportionate dam-
age to the supervised entity concerned.
Neither the CRD IV nor the SSMR address the question of “what 
form this publication should take in relation to the presumption 
of innocence”.72 In other words, does the publication of a sanc-
tion which is made when the case is under appeal scrutiny con-
stitute a violation of the presumption of innocence? A possible 
answer to this question can be found in the draft directive of the 
Commission on the presumption of innocence. This Proposal 
requires that Member States must ensure that, before a final 
conviction, public statements and official decisions from pub-
lic authorities do not refer to suspects or accused persons as if 
they have already been convicted. According to the Commis-
sion, the presumption of innocence should be without preju-
dice to the possibility of the publication, according to national 
law, of decisions imposing sanctions following administrative 
proceedings. This raises the question of what the role of the 
presumption of innocence is in case of naming and shaming in 
administrative proceedings. The European legal framework is 
uncertain because until now, neither the ECJ, nor the ECtHR 
has given any ruling on the question of whether naming and 
shaming in the national financial market regulations of the EU 
Member States violates the presumption of innocence. How-
ever, the ECHR clearly states that, even though anticipate en-
forcement in administrative proceedings cannot be radically 
excluded, “the Member States are required to confine such 
enforcement within reasonable limits that strike a fair balance 
between the mutual interests involved”.73 
III.  Judicial Review of Measures and Penalties
Previous paragraphs have listed coercive measures and admin-
istrative sanctions that the ECB may use in carrying out its 
centralised supervisory tasks, autonomously or in cooperation 
with the national authorities. The system of administering EU 
banking supervisory law based on the interplay of two legal 
systems leads to intriguing questions with regard to judicial 
review and the legal protection of the supervised entity. 
Nevertheless, effective judicial protection is a fundamental 
right of the EU legal order. Judicial review is the means by 
which courts exercise their supervisory control over the ad-
ministrative measures or penalties applied by a State enforce-
ment agency.74 It represents a structural component of any sys-
tem pretending to be respectful of the rule of law.  It is protected 
by Arts. 6 and 13 of the ECHR and now fully codified in Art. 41, 
47(2) and 48 of the EU Charter. This right covers:
  The right for the individuals to enforce their rights before 
a court.
  The fact that the court should comply with several structural 
requirements such as impartiality and independence, fair trial, 
reasonable time, etc.
In an interconnected multi-layered system like the SSM the 
issue needs to be analysed in a multilevel dimension, includ-
ing the EU and the national level. The first question to be 
addressed concerns the ‘formal’ statute of judicial review as 
to whether acts and decisions in the supervisory process of 
credit institutions can be challenged before a court and, if 
so, which court, European or national. The second question 
concerns the “substantial” statute of judicial review: what is 
the content of such control? Which requirements are subject 
to judicial control? 
Legal protection against banking supervision measures and 
sanctions may thus become quite complex. A supervised en-
tity can be affected by decisions taken by the ECB of by the 
NCAs and for each decision it should rely on a different ju-
dicial review mechanism, being it at the European or at the 
national level. 
eucrim   4 / 2015  | 159
invEStigAtivE AnD SAnCtiOning POwErS Of thE ECb
At the European level, Art. 24 SSMR confers the internal 
control over the legality of the ECB decisions to an Admin-
istrative Board of Review, a board with the task to carry out 
an internal administrative review of the decisions taken by 
the ECB in the exercise of its powers. The internal review 
can be introduced by a natural or legal person concerned 
within one month from the notification of the decision. The 
request has no suspensory effect and it “shall pertain to the 
procedural and substantive conformity with this Regulation 
of such decisions”,75while the nature of such a board is un-
certain: Art. 12(4) states that it “should act independently 
and in the public interest” but its direct connection with 
the ECB, being a part of it, justifies some scepticism on its 
capacity to fulfil the requirements of impartiality and inde-
pendence set up by the ECHR case law.
Furthermore, the board cannot overrule the ECB decision un-
der scrutiny; it can only express a reasoned opinion that the 
Supervisory Board should “take into account” when adopt-
ing a new decision.76 In this light, its decisional powers are 
so limited as to exclude that it might satisfy the requirements 
of “judicial review”. Nevertheless, when it comes to adminis-
trative penalties, it is sufficient for the ECHR that the person 
concerned should have had at least one chance to have the final 
decision to be reviewed by a Court. This possibility is given 
by Art. 24(11) providing that the existence of the internal board 
“is without prejudice to the right to bring proceedings before the 
CJEU in accordance with the Treaties”. Nevertheless, one should 
consider that the ECJ case law has held that when the application 
of an act of Union law by a Union institution requires complex 
assessments, the authority enjoys a wide measure of discretion, 
the exercise of which is subject to limited judicial review. “The 
judicature will only scrutinize the authority’s decision for a man-
ifest error or misuse of powers and whether it clearly did not 
exceed the bounds of its discretion”.77 In this light, the possibility 
to challenge the ECB decision before the Court of Justice may 
not always prove sufficient.
Furthermore, as previously analysed, the ECB is applying also 
national law in it supervisory tasks. How can the judicial re-
view of ECB decisions based on national law be organised? 
Indeed, in order to respect the fundamental right of effective 
judicial protection, ECB decisions must be subject to judicial 
review. It should be stressed that the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU) has exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the validity of 
ECB decisions. This implies that in case of an ECB decision 
based on national law, the CJEU would have to adjudicate on 
the basis of national law. In terms of European law, this result 
is striking. According to today’s legal framework, the ECJ can 
only adjudicate on the basis of applicable EU law, while the 
application and interpretation of national law is exclusively 
reserved to national judges. 
Issues also arise when it comes to the national level, especial-
ly when penalties are applied by NCAs under request of the 
ECB. In these cases, the natural or legal persons affected by 
the decision are entitled to lodge an appeal before the compe-
tent national court. But which are the powers of national courts 
in these cases? To what extent they may assess the legality or 
the appropriateness of the measure? These questions remain 
for the time being unanswered.
IV.  Conclusions
The purpose of this contribution has been to give an overview 
on how supervision of the largest banks in the Eurozone has 
been designed, to unpack the toolbox, to shed light on the 
ECB’s enforcement powers, to raise concerns and to identify 
challenges. The framework suggests scholars must address ba-
sically three issues.
  First, how to grant an effective enforcement of such a com-
plex legal and institutional design? The complexity of the 
supervisory system and the partly unclear division of tasks 
between the European and the national level justifies a cer-
tain scepticism about its effectiveness. How the ECB and the 
NCAs will manage their forced cooperation in order to enforce 
such a complex machine is to be seen in the coming years?
  Second, the SSM relies more and more on administrative 
penalties as regulatory measures. The reform packages in the 
banking sector increased enormously the number of adminis-
trative sanctions and their severity. The nature of these sanc-
tions seems to be questionable. Boundaries between adminis-
trative and criminal penalties are becoming hazy because are 
taking on the elements of each other creating a third kind of 
phenomenon, a greyzone of “criministrative law”.78 If ana-
lysed in the light of the case law of the ECHR, banking sanc-
tions seem to be criminal in their essence.79 
  And, thirdly, if this is the case, what kind of procedural safe-
guards should apply? Are the procedural safeguards provided 
by the banking regulations adequate to the standards set up by 
the European court of human rights? Judicial protection seems 
highly problematic and several fundamental rights are not suf-
ficiently protected.
The SSM entered into force only one year ago and for the 
time being concrete case law is lacking. It might prove that 
the incorporation in regulatory law on banking supervision of 
principles and safeguards belonging to criminal law is recom-
mended and maybe overdue.
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The “Europeanization” of Financial Supervision  
in the Aftermath of the Crisis
Konstantina Panagiannaki
In the aftermath of the economic crisis, that began in 2007 
in the U.S.A. and spread to the European economy, weaken-
ing the EU, every discussion about its causes and how to ad-
dress them was linked to the absence of a suitable supervisory1 
framework. The EU has been accused of lacking sufficient 
legal tools both at a precautionary level as well as for crisis 
management.2 Even though the internal market of financial 
services had been making progress, up until 2007 there were 
no truly centralized3 mechanisms and tools to supervise finan-
cial activities, identify their complexity, their risks and the 
interconnections between the financial institutes, as indicated 
by the De Larosière Report.4  Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” 
and de-regulation5 as a dominant approach had been proven 
insufficient to address the fragmentation of financial institutes, 
which were acting on a European level, but were supervised 
nationally.6 The EU responded with a reform and established 
a new supervisory system consisting of the ESFS7 (European 
System of Financial Supervision) and the SSM8 (Single Super-
visor Mechanism). ESFS is a network of European agencies 
and national authorities that applies to the whole financial sec-
tor. The SSM constitutes the first pillar of the banking union, 
applies only to credit institutes, and is a composite administra-
tion of the ECB and the national competent authorities.          
This article seeks to explore this new infrastructure by exam-
ining its tasks and the sanctions it can address. For the purpose 
of this contribution, I use the term “Europeanization” in quo-
tation marks in order to describe this reform, because ESFS 
and SSM do not possess the same level of centralization. As 
far as the ESFS is concerned, the supervision remains mainly 
on a national level, but the EU agencies play a significant role 
in unifying its application. On the contrary, SSM constitutes a 
fully centralized supervisor.
I.  European Supervisory System
1.		Macroeconomic9 Level
To undo the mistakes of the past,10 the EU set up the ESRB 
(European Systemic Risk Board) with the mandate to over-
see risks in the financial system as a whole. The outburst of 
the crisis made it apparent, that macroprudential supervision 
had been neglected. Therefore, the establishment of the ESRB 
seeks to remedy this deficiency and defines in Art. 2 lit. (c) 
Reg. 1092/2010 the notion of systemic risk. The ESRB was 
established by Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 and entered 
into force on 26 December 2010. It is founded upon Art. 114 
TFEU, the title of which is “Approximation of laws”. The 
question that arises is whether the set-up of a committee can 
be regarded as an approximation measure. This question will 
be addressed in relation to the other parts of the ESFS, as they 
share the same legal basis. Because its Secretariat is support-
ed and located within the European Central Bank (ECB), the 
legal framework of ESRB is complemented by the Council 
